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Abstract
This paper analyzes the regional eﬀects of EU Regional Policy during four pro-
gramming periods: 1989-1993, 1994-1999, 2000-2006, 2007-2013. In particular, the
focus is on the impact of transfers during the Financial and Economic Crisis and on
the eﬀects of gaining versus losing treatment status under the main Regional Policy
subprogram – referred to as Objective 1 or Convergence Objective. We ﬁnd that
eﬀects of Objective 1 status on growth are positive though not very long-lived: the
eﬀects of losing Objective 1 status on economic growth are negative, and the earlier
positive eﬀects on growth in the period(s) of Objective 1 treatment more or less un-
done. We show that the eﬀects are weaker during the Crisis than before, in particular,
on per-capita income in countries where the Crisis hit harder.
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1 Introduction
The European Union (EU) runs a system of public transfers to subnational regions. The
general idea of EU transfers – which are labeled European Agricultural Guarantee Fund
(EAGF) and European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) in the context
of agriculture and Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund in the context of infrastructure,
education, and labor markets – is to foster structural and economic homogeneity across
countries and regions in order to make the EU’s system of market integration viable. As
early as 1973, the British Commissioner for Regional Policy, George Thomson, argued
that regional policy is “necessary” to help the poorer regions of Europe.
We focus on Structural and Cohesion Funds, the second-largest budget line after the
EU’s agricultural expenses. Economic research in recent years focused on its eﬀectiveness.1
The insights from this work were three: expenses through the EU’s Structural and Cohe-
sion Funds (i) induced positive average eﬀects on per-capita income growth in subnational
regions that lagged behind the EU average; (ii) more expenses did not generally induce
proportionately larger eﬀects; (iii) regions responded heterogeneously, with smaller eﬀects
found in regions where the institutions are bad (corruption is high) and where human
capital is scarce. Most of the work on the EU’s regional transfer scheme identiﬁed positive
eﬀects on recipient-region economic growth.2
The present paper considers all programming periods 1989-93, 1994-99, 2000-06, and
2007-13. Including the latest completed programming period, 2007-13, goes beyond pre-
vious work and might speak to the eﬀectiveness of EU Regional Policy at times of the
Economic and Financial Crisis relative to “normal” times. In particular we explore hetero-
geneity across transfer recipients in terms of their exposure to the Financial and Economic
Crisis. We concentrate on the eﬀects of Objective 1 treatment (now called Convergence
Objective) on a variety of outcomes such as growth of per-capita income and employment,
and total as well as public investment intensity.
Going beyond cross-sectional identiﬁcation, we seek to estimate the eﬀects on economic
growth and other outcomes when a region switches into, and eventually loses, Objective 1
status – an issue which requires data from the last two programming periods 2000-06 and
2007-13 and which, with the exception of Barone, David, and de Blasio (2016), has not
been studied.3 A region may lose Objective 1 status for two reasons: being just below the
1See, e.g., Becker, Egger, and von Ehrlich, 2010, 2012, 2013; Pellegrini, Terribile, Tarola, Muccigrosso,
and Busillo, 2013; Cerqua and Pellegrini, 2015.
2See Ederveen, Gorter, de Mooij, and Nahuis, 2002; Cappelen, Castellacci, Fagerberg, and Verspagen,
2003; Dall’erba and Le Gallo, 2008; Becker, Egger, and von Ehrlich, 2010, 2012, 2013; Pellegrini, Terribile,
Tarola, Muccigrosso, and Busillo; 2013; Cerqua and Pellegrini, 2015; Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015;
see Mohl and Hagen, 2010, for an overview.
3Barone, David, and de Blasio (2016) study the case of one Italian region (Abruzzi) that lost its funding
status de jure at the end of 1999 and de facto at the end of 2000. They use a synthetic control method (i.e.,
they generate an artiﬁcial Abruzzi region by weighting other Italian regions). In contrast, our approach
focuses on the loss of Objective 1 or status at large, considering all EU regions, and it is based on a
regression discontinuity design, which identiﬁes the treatment eﬀect from a subsample of EU regions in
the vicinity of the 75% of EU average per-capita income threshold.
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75% threshold in the previous period, it might overtake other regions and end up above the
75% threshold. Alternatively, the expansion of the EU into Eastern Europe pulled down
the 75% threshold in absolute terms: the same absolute level of GDP per capita which
made a region eligible beforehand, no longer satisﬁes eligibility. The associated results
may speak to the longevity – or, conversely, the short-livedness – of the growth eﬀects
from receiving funding. A priori, one could imagine three possible scenarios for regions
which lose Structural and Cohesion Funds recipient status: (i) the earlier funding might
have put them on a permanently higher growth trajectory; (ii) the loss of funding status
might make them return more or less rapidly to a growth trajectory corresponding to
their economic fundamentals without funding; or (iii) they might suﬀer from the “sudden
stop” of losing large amounts of EU funding and face a growth of even less than the one
corresponding to their economic fundamentals without funding. Transfers associated with
Objective 1 did, on average, over the quarter of a century, 1989-2013, generate additional
growth in per-capita income among the funded regions in the EU, but less strongly so
in 2000-13 than on average. Regions that lose Objective 1 status fall behind the average
non-recipient region in terms of economic growth, and earlier positive growth eﬀects from
such funding are more than undone, at least in the short run. Focusing on regions that
receive Objective 1 transfers for the ﬁrst time we ﬁnd immediate positive eﬀects which are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the eﬀects observed for the average recipient region.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the econometric
setup. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally,
Section 5 provides a policy discussion and concludes.
2 Empirical approach
We consider an approach, where the treatment is a binary Objective 1/Convergence Ob-
jective indicator for NUTS2 region i and program period r. We will generally use Yir
for economic outcomes and Xir for the forcing variable. In particular, we need to distin-
guish between funding eligibility (according to the 75% cutoﬀ rule regarding EU average
per-capita income), Eir, and actual treatment, Dir, as there were some exceptions from
the treatment rule, giving rise to a fuzzy regression-discontinuity design (RDD). Figure 1
shows the corresponding discontinuity in the treatment probability for the pooled sample
across all pre-budgetary-period years r in the data. We estimate the fuzzy RDD in a
two-stage least-squares approach where the ﬁrst- and second-stage regression equations,
respectively, are given by:
Dir = h0(Xir) + Eir[γ1 + h1(Xir)− h0(Xir)] + ζir + νir, (1)
Yir = f0(Xir) +Dir[α1 + f1(Xir)− f0(Xir)] + ηir + εir, (2)
with α1 measuring the local average treatment eﬀect (LATE) of binary Objective 1 transfer
treatment. Akin to h1(Xir) and h0(Xir) in the ﬁrst stage, f1(Xir) and f0(Xir) are ﬂex-
ible, smooth (diﬀerentiable) functions of pre-budgetary-period normalized log-per-capita
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income in purchasing power parity. The functions h1 (f1) and h0 (f0) are separately esti-
mated for the eligible (treated) and non-eligible (non-treated) observations, respectively,
and include linear and quadratic terms of normalized per-capita GDP.4 The terms ζir and
ηir reﬂect row vectors of eﬀects, including ﬁxed country and time eﬀects and, in some of
the analysis, the impact of country-level government-bond-yield spreads as measures of
the Financial and Economic Crisis.
3 Data and descriptive statistics
We downloaded data on most variables from Eurostat Regional Statistics. We complement
this by data from Cambridge Econometrics. The information about Objective 1 status and
eligibility as well as information on expenditures stem from the European Commission.
See Table A1 for details about the data sources.
Treatment variable The binary Objective 1 treatment indicator variable, Dir, is de-
termined on the basis of NUTS2 real per-capita levels in speciﬁc years prior to each
programming period.5 Given non-compliance, we need to distinguish between eligible and
recipient NUTS2 regions. Two important reasons for non-compliance are: (i) regions that
did not qualify for Objective 1 status based on the data available at the time when regional
funds were assigned, turned out to be eligible ex post (or vice versa), when GDP ﬁgures
were revised; (ii) speciﬁc exceptions were granted to regions with a low population density
and in peripheral locations.6
Outcome variables We consider the following outcomes: average annual PPP-adjusted
GDP-per-capita growth; average annual employment growth; average annual total invest-
ment intensity (gross ﬁxed capital formation relative to GDP); and average annual public
investment intensity (gross ﬁxed capital formation of the public sector relative to GDP).
Control variables In some of the regressions we control for ﬁxed country and time
eﬀects and, in a smaller set of regressions, also for the eﬀects of government-bond-yield
spreads (GBYS) with ten years of maturity which vary across countries and years. The
latter were collected from the European Central Bank (ECB) and the OECD.7
4We do not consider non-parametric speciﬁcations of these functions for two reasons: ﬁrst, we focus
on switchers with respect to Objective 1 status and the mass of switchers is not large enough to support
non-parametric estimation; second, there is no existing procedure to determine the optimal bandwidth for
non-parametric RDD with panel data and ﬁxed eﬀects.
5These years were 1983-85, 1988-90, 1994-96 (1997-99 for new members), 2000-2002 for the four pro-
gramming periods considered here. See the EU Council Regulations 2052/88, 2082/93, 502/1999, 595/2006,
and 189/2007, for further details.
6Examples for such NUTS2 recipient regions are ones in northern Sweden and eastern Austria.
7We calculate the GBYS as follows. For most countries, we take the diﬀerence between the
harmonized long-term interest rates on government bonds and the short-term rates of the ECB
(ﬁxed-rate tenders within the main reﬁnancing operations) which are provided on-line by the ECB
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Sample composition We do not include Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia in the anal-
ysis for reasons of data availability. In order to harmonize the data, we use Eurostat’s
correspondence tables and assign all observations in the periods 1989-93, 1994-99 accord-
ing to the NUTS classiﬁcation from 2003 and those in the periods 1994-99, and 2000-06
according to the NUTS classiﬁcation from 2006.8 The number of NUTS2 regions available
after harmonizing data on economic outcome from Cambridge Econometrics and the Eu-
ropean Commission’s Structural Funds is 187 in 1989-93, 209 in 1994-99, 253 in 2000-06,
and 253 in 2007-13.
Descriptive statistics for variables at the NUTS2 level Table 1 shows eligibility
for Objective 1 funding (dubbed Eir in Section 2) and actual treatment (Dir). While Panel
A pools regions over all programming periods so that the numbers refer to region-period
observations (one observation representing one NUTS2 region in a single programming
period), Panels B-E present the programming-period-speciﬁc numbers. We brieﬂy discuss
the numbers in Panel A. Altogether, of 1,153 NUTS2-region-by-period observations cov-
ered, 343 were eligible for Objective 1 treatment, while 374 actually got funding. Cases
where eligible regions did not get Objective 1 treatment are rare (18 out of 343 obser-
vations), but treatment in absence of a formal eligibility in terms of the initial-period
per-capita-income rule are not as infrequent (49 out of 810 cases). Objective 1 treatment
eligibility generally guaranteed actual treatment unless national governments did not pro-
vide data on per-capita incomes at the appropriate regional level. Objective 1 treatment
for ineligible regions roots in a number of exceptions that were formulated in the respective
budgets (see Section 3 for examples).
Table A2 shows summary statistics for key variables of interest, pooled over the four
programming periods 1989-93, 1994-99, 2000-06, and 2007-13: GDP per capita growth is
measured as the average annual diﬀerence of the logarithms of end-of-period and prior-to-
period GDP per capita. The prior-to-period years are 1988 for 1989-93, 1993 for 1994-99,
1999 for 2000-06, and 2006 for 2007-13.9 Employment growth is also deﬁned in terms of
logarithms and for the same years, while (total) Investment per GDP and Public invest-
ment per GDP are average ratios observed across all years during a programming period.
Hence, with GDP per capita growth, an average of 0.03 indicates an average annual growth
rate of about 3 percent during a programming period. With, e.g., Investment per GDP, an
average of 0.23 indicates an average annual investment rate of 23 percent of GDP during
a programming period. The means of .31 for actual treatment (Dir) and of .28 for treat-
ment eligibility (Eir) are consistent with the numbers in Table 1. The ﬁnal row displays
per-capita GDP in purchasing-power parity terms as a deviation from the respective EU
(www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/html/index.en.html). Where these data are not available, we take the diﬀerence
between the long-term interest rates on government bonds and the short-term interest rates of that country
provided by the OECD (using the Monetary and Financial Statistics Database).
8See data appendix for details.
9The prior-to-period years in the table should not be confused with the set of years prior to each
programming period which served to determine Objective 1-treatment eligibility based on average real
per-capita-income levels.
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average (referred to as X˘ir in Section 2): negative numbers indicate normalized values
of by-rule eligible NUTS2 regions, while positive numbers indicate normalized values of
by-rule ineligible NUTS2 regions.
Validity of the RDD setup Figure 2 shows the density distribution of GDP per capita
relative to the 75% threshold when pooling observations across all four programming
periods. This ﬁgure following McCrary (2008) does not indicate any manipulation of
GDP per capita in order to gain eligibility for Objective 1 funds, as would be suggested
by a spike in the number of regions just below the 75% threshold. In particular, we obtain
an estimate of 0.02 for the discontinuity of the density function at the threshold and a
relatively large standard error of 0.11.
A further test for the validity of the RDD setup is to check whether not only the
treatment (as illustrated in Figure 1) but also covariates displayed a discontinuity at the
threshold. We graphically document a lack of discontinuity for a number of candidate
covariates (employment share in services; employment share in manufacturing; popula-
tion per square kilometer; employment measured at the employment location over active
population measured at the residence location) for the sample at hand in Figure A1 in
the Appendix. All of these variables could be thought of as determinants of economic
growth.10
These tests together suggest that (a) there is no manipulation of GDP per capita to
obtain eligibility and (b) there is no jump in any of the covariates at the 75% threshold, so
the only jump of interest is the one in treatment status and subsequently in the outcomes
of interest.
4 Local average eﬀects of binary Objective 1 treatment
Period 1989-2013 Table 2 summarizes results based on the approach in Section 2 and
the pooled data for 1989-2013 in Section 3. Column (1) pertains to a linear speciﬁcation
in terms of the forcing variable, Xir. Column (2) is the same as Column (1) except that
NUTS2 ﬁxed eﬀects across programming periods are included. With dense-enough data –
i.e., with suﬃciently many observations in the neighborhood of Xir = 0 – including such
ﬁxed eﬀects (or any other control variable) would not be necessary as observations on both
sides of the thresholds are quasi identical. However, given the limited number of NUTS2
regions at hand, it may be that unobserved factors still vary across eligible and non-eligible
regions and thus controlling for ﬁxed NUTS2 eﬀects might be desirable. Columns (3) and
(4) correspond to Columns (1) and (2), respectively, except that they use linear as well as
quadratic terms of Xir.
The parameters in Panel A of Table 2 are relatively stable across the four columns
of interest, and they vary between 0.012 in Column (3) and 0.019 in Columns (2) and
(4). These ﬁndings support an increase in period-speciﬁc per-capita-income growth by
10Similar evidence for continuity of covariates in the ﬁrst three periods 1989-2006 is documented in Fig.
4 of Becker et al. (2010).
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somewhat less than 2 percentage points due to Objective 1 treatment. These results are
quantitatively close to the ﬁndings in Becker, Egger, and von Ehrlich (2010) for only
three programming periods. The fact that including versus excluding the region-speciﬁc
ﬁxed eﬀects is of little bearing for the statistical (and economic) signiﬁcance of the results
suggests that omitted variables are of minor importance, and the RDD is quite successful
in isolating the causal eﬀect of Objective 1 treatment on per-capita income growth.
This is much less the case for Employment growth and (total) Investment per GDP
(i.e., investment intensity) in Panels B and C, respectively. There, we ﬁnd statistically sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects on employment growth (negative) and investment intensity (positive) only
when not controlling for region-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, whereas the impact of Objective 1
treatment is statistically insigniﬁcant when accounting for those eﬀects. This suggests
that Objective 1 treatment and/or the forcing variable is correlated with time-invariant
determinants of employment growth and investment intensity (this is diﬀerent from the
determinants of and results for per-capita income growth). With regard to Public in-
vestment per GDP we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and robust eﬀect of about 2.2 percentage points.
Hence, we should be more cautious in interpreting the eﬀects on employment and private
investment relative to the ones on per-capita-income growth or on public investment in-
tensity. Moreover, the results suggest that the increased accumulation of public capital
stock crowds out some private investments.
Period 2000-13 and the Financial and Economic Crisis Table 3 repeats the anal-
ysis of Table 2 for only the last two programming periods. This serves two purposes:
ﬁrst, it allows us to understand whether eﬀects of Objective 1 transfers are stable over
time; second, it provides estimates for the role of Objective 1 transfers for regions in more
versus less crisis-stricken countries. The table is organized in six columns. The results in
Columns (1)-(3) are based on linear functions of the forcing variable, Xir, while Columns
(4)-(6) are based on quadratic functions of it. Columns (2) and (5) include NUTS2-region
and time ﬁxed eﬀects, whereas the other columns only include country and time ﬁxed
eﬀects. Columns (3) and (6) account for the average treatment eﬀect as a parameter
on the Objective 1 indicator, on the main eﬀect of the Financial and Economic Crisis
through the government-bond-yield spreads (GBYS) variable, and an interaction term of
the former with the demeaned GBYS. The coeﬃcient on the latter may inform us about
the heterogeneity of the LATE of Objective 1 treatment in terms of the country-level
GBYS.11
The ﬁndings for the main eﬀect of Objective 1 transfers in the periods 2000-06 and
2007-13 in Columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) are somewhat diﬀerent from the ones for the pooled
period in 1989-2013: (a) GDP growth eﬀects are smaller than for 1989-2013; (b) interest-
ingly, there is a positive eﬀect on employment growth in that subperiod; (c) there is no
eﬀect on the total investment intensity as with pooling over all programming periods; and
11When running the same regressions as in Table 3 for the NUTS2 regions of EU15 countries only in the
programming periods spanning 2000-13 in Table A4, we ﬁnd very similar eﬀects as in Table 3. Hence, the
diﬀerence in the results between the last two programming periods and the earlier ones in 1989-99 (or the
pooled sample for 1989-2013) should not be attributed to the diﬀerence in the sample composition.
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(d) there is no longer an eﬀect on the public investment intensity. A lower level of GBYS
reﬂects a greater degree of sustainability of public ﬁnances in a country. Accordingly,
countries that were hit harder by the European Crisis are characterized by a relatively
sharp increase in GBYS after 2008. The results in Columns (3) and (6) of Table 2 suggest
that the Crisis induced negative eﬀects on per-capita-income and employment growth of
similar magnitude. However, a greater exposure to the Crisis (reﬂected in a bigger increase
in GBYS) resulted in a lower Objective 1-treatment eﬀect on per-capita-income growth
and a higher Objective 1-treatment eﬀect on employment growth than on average. Hence,
Objective 1 treatment was less successful to shield regions of adverse eﬀects in terms of
per-capita-income growth than of ones in terms of employment. The results suggest that
an increase in GBYS by about one-and-a-half standard deviations fully cancels the posi-
tive average treatment eﬀect of Objective 1 transfers (the standard deviation of GBYS in
the data is 1.89). Such an increase was experienced in Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, and in the Slovak Republic during 2007-13. One ex-
planation for this result is the requirement for local co-ﬁnancing to receive transfers. The
EU recognized this issue and reduced co-ﬁnancing rates during the crisis (see EU Council
Regulation 18512/11), but this adjustment apparently came late and was not suﬃcient to
accommodate the needs to cushion the detrimental eﬀects of the Crisis on the eﬀects of
Objective 1 transfers on real income growth.12
Entering and Loosing Objective 1 status: 1989-2013 With the four programming
periods at hand, we may for the ﬁrst time study how regions developed after having lost
their Objective 1 status in the EU as a whole.13 Table 4 lists the regions that dropped out
of the Objective 1 program in the periods 2000-06 and 2007-13 (note that all regions that
had received Objective 1 support in 1989-93 did remain in the program also during 1994-
1999). Diﬀerent from the fuzzy RDD in equations (1)-(2), this model excludes observations
which continually receive Objective 1 treatment when exploring the eﬀects of Entering
Objective 1 and it excludes observations which never received Objective 1 treatment when
exploring the eﬀects of Losing Objective 1. Again we control for asymmetric functions
of the forcing variable and report the linear and quadratic models with GDP per capita
growth, employment growth, investment per GDP, and public investment per GDP as
alternative outcomes. We generally include NUTS2 ﬁxed eﬀects in these speciﬁcations
such that the eﬀects are identiﬁed from units that changed Objective 1 status. Table 5
reports the corresponding results where Columns (1) and (2) show the eﬀects of Entering
Objective 1 and Columns (3) and (4) the ones of Losing Objective 1. The former is to be
interpreted as the gains of a newly treated region compared to those that never receive
Objective 1 transfers. Analogously, the eﬀect of Losing Objective 1 reﬂects the reduction
12Using data on allocations to NUTS2 regions and eﬀective expenditure paid out to NUTS2 regions,
we can compute an absorption rate for aggregate EU transfers and correlate this ratio with GBYS. It
turns out that regions with a higher crisis exposure also had a lower absorption rate during 2007-13, as is
indicated by a correlation coeﬃcient of −0.504 between the two measures.
13As mentioned in the introduction, Barone et al. (2016) study the case of one speciﬁc Italian region,
Abruzzi, after losing its transfer status.
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in economic activity when losing transfers compared to a counterfactual where transfers
continue to be received. Note that there are several types of regions: non-Objective 1
regions which mostly receive a low but positive treatment intensity (via Objective 2 and 3),
regions that were assigned phasing-out Objective 1 status and regions that were assigned
Objective 1 status in spite of not being eligible according to the 75% threshold rule, and
regions that were assigned Objective 1 status according to the rule. Notably the latter
category receives about 2-3 times higher transfers (in the budgeting periods 2000-06 and
2007-13) than the regions that were assigned Objective 1 due to some exceptions.14 As
we aim to study the eﬀects of switching from strict Objective 1 status to the non-eligible
status and vice versa, we restrict the sample in the following to the units which complied
with the treatment rule.
Compared to regions that neither received Objective 1 transfers in t nor in t−1, those
that entered into the program in period t but did not receive transfers in t − 1 grew 2.1
to 2.6 percentage points more than never-treated comparison regions. In contrast, regions
that dropped out of Objective 1 status in t and accordingly lost substantial transfers
compared to t − 1 grew 1.7 percentage points less than the always-treated comparison
regions. These estimates are very stable across speciﬁcations and highly signiﬁcant. With
regard to employment growth we observe a signiﬁcant eﬀect of entering into treatment
whereas losing Objective 1 status is not related to signiﬁcant immediate reductions in
employment growth. Considering the immediate drop in income and the slow response of
labor markets this seems plausible. For investments, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀects.
These ﬁndings suggest that the positive contemporaneous responses to transfers are
not permanent and seem to vanish when transfers are stopped. While there is a signiﬁcant
and sizable contemporaneous eﬀect of Objective 1 transfers this may be largely due to con-
sumption eﬀects and it remains questionable, whether self-sustaining growth is triggered
by the transfers, at least by their recipience over less than two decades. The evidence sug-
gests that the contemporaneous beneﬁts of transfers are undone after losing Objective 1
status. This ﬁnding is very much in line with Barone et al. (2016) who ﬁnd the same
result in their study of the Italian Abruzzi region. Our result that Objective 1 treatment
eﬀects are not long-lasting is in line with the overall pattern of GDP per capita (PPP)
disparities across EU15 NUTS2 regions measured in terms of the coeﬃcient of variation
(CV) and the ratio of the distribution’s range and the mean (Range/mean) as summa-
rized in Table 6. While it is impossible to isolate the causal role of transfers regarding
this descriptive evidence, it nevertheless indicates that overall economic disparities among
the EU15 NUTS2 regions did not decline such that transfers were at least not capable
of compensating any other trends that contributed to increasing disparities among the
respective regions over a relatively large time window.
14Phasing-out is most important in the 2007-13 period, as then the benchmark level for average GDP
per capita was based on EU25 rather than EU15 per-capita income, and several formerly eligible NUTS2
regions lost their eligibility for Objective 1 funding due to the reduction of the average per-capita income
in the extended EU25 compared to the former EU15. Table A3 provides a list of EU15 regions that would
have been eligible for Objective 1 funding during 2007-13 if the average per-capita income in the EU15
rather than the EU25 would have been applied.
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5 Discussion and conclusions
After agricultural assistance, the European Union’s Regional Policy is the second-biggest
line in the Union’s budget. At times of tighter budgets due to stagnation if not economic
downturn, voters and politicians in net-contributing (to the EU budget) countries and
regions ask about the justiﬁcation of such budgets, even more so than at times of economic
prosperity.
This paper sheds light on the eﬀects of the Structural Funds in recipient regions. It
illustrates that the programme induced positive eﬀects not only over all periods for which
data exist in the past but also in the two most recent completed budgetary periods (2000-
06 and 2007-13) which were aﬀected adversely by cyclical phenomena. The eﬀects of
transfers in the Crisis period were weaker than before, in particular, on per-capita income
in countries where the Crisis hit harder. Adjustments with regard to co-ﬁnancing were
successful in strengthening the treatment eﬀect of Objective 1 or Convergence Objective
transfers on employment growth but not on income growth in particularly Crisis-prone
regions. Another insight is that transfers tend to display immediate eﬀects, but they do
not show much longevity beyond a programming period when it comes to stimulating
real per-capita-income growth in recipient regions. Hence, previous growth gains seem
to be largely undone once Objective 1 status is lost. This ﬁnding is consistent with
the idea that Objective 1 status – when awarded at all – should probably be kept for
longer periods and should be geared towards investments that support long-term growth
prospects. Otherwise, some regions might just see a one-oﬀ bonanza without any long-term
beneﬁts.
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Table 1: Eligibility and actual treatment under Objective 1 according to 75% GDP per
capita threshold
1989-2013 Objective 1 treatment
Eligible for Objective 1 0 1 Total
0 761 49 810
1 18 325 343
Total 779 374 1153
1989-1993
0 131 9 140
1 4 43 47
Total 135 52 187
1994-1999
0 148 14 162
1 3 44 47
Total 151 58 209
2000-2006
0 149 12 161
1 5 87 92
Total 154 99 253
2007-2013
0 181 2 183
1 2 68 70
Total 183 70 253
Notes: For the ﬁrst and second programming periods our samples base on the NUTS2 classiﬁcation from 2003.
This yields 187 EU12 NUTS2 regions in 1989-1993 and 209 EU15 NUTS2 regions in 1994-1999. In the last two
programming periods our sample bases on the 2006 classiﬁcation which yields 253 EU25 NUTS2 regions in 2000-
2006 and 2007-2013. Phasing-out regions are treated as non-Objective 1 regions. Results are robust to deﬁning
phasing-out regions are treated as Objective 1 regions.
Table 2: Eﬀects of Objective 1 treatment – 1989-2013
Linear 2nd. order polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP per capita growth
Objective 1 0.013∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
Fixed eﬀects no yes no yes
Observations 901 901 901 901
No. regions 259 259 259 259
F ﬁrst-stage 689.104 140.088 477.942 133.942
AIC -5182.407 -5463.379 -5194.106 -5464.468
Employment growth
Objective 1 -0.005∗∗ 0.005 -0.008∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
Fixed eﬀects no yes no yes
Observations 901 901 901 901
No. regions 259 259 259 259
F ﬁrst-stage 689.104 140.088 477.942 133.942
AIC -5208.505 -5566.503 -5202.542 -5607.387
Investment per GDP
Objective 1 0.043∗∗∗ -0.002 0.033∗∗∗ -0.002
(0.009) (0.017) (0.011) (0.017)
Fixed eﬀects no yes no yes
Observations 901 901 901 901
No. regions 259 259 259 259
F ﬁrst-stage 689.104 140.088 477.942 133.942
AIC -2736.250 -3615.999 -2740.356 -3614.497
Public investment per GDP
Objective 1 0.037∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009)
Fixed eﬀects no yes no yes
Observations 740 740 740 740
No. regions 252 252 252 252
F ﬁrst-stage 481.554 95.405 362.836 94.245
AIC -3630.509 -4192.137 -3644.522 -4197.942
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. . All estimates base on a two-
stage least square approach using eligibility as the instrument, controlling for the forcing variable and its interactions,
and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Speciﬁcations without NUTS2 ﬁxed eﬀects include country ﬁxed eﬀects. Growth rates refer
to log diﬀerences divided by the number of years. Investment rates refer to the sum of investments divided by the
sum of GDP over the respective programming period. Lower AIC indicates better model-ﬁt. For details about the
data sources see Table A1.
Table 3: Eﬀects of Objective 1 treatment during the Crisis – 2000-2013
Linear 2nd. order polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita growth
Objective 1 0.006∗∗∗ 0.012∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.014∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
Objective 1×GBYS -0.004∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
GBYS -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
NUTS2 ﬁxed eﬀects no yes yes no yes yes
Observations 506 506 428 506 506 428
No. regions 253 253 253 253 253 253
AIC -3022.157 -3271.642 -2970.299 -3028.902 -3344.430 -2984.258
Employment growth
Objective 1 0.006∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.015∗ 0.003 0.017∗∗∗ 0.012
(0.002) (0.006) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008)
Objective 1×GBYS 0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
GBYS -0.005∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
NUTS2 ﬁxed eﬀects no yes yes no yes yes
Observations 506 506 428 506 506 428
No. regions 253 253 253 253 253 253
AIC -3047.726 -3323.749 -2885.460 -3055.183 -3351.848 -2917.826
Investment per GDP
Objective 1 0.007 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.008 0.008
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.015)
Objective 1×GBYS 0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
GBYS -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
NUTS2 ﬁxed eﬀects no yes yes no yes yes
Observations 506 506 428 506 506 428
No. regions 253 253 253 253 253 253
AIC -1758.079 -2846.211 -2349.714 -1757.593 -2846.036 -2351.288
Public investment per GDP
Objective 1 0.016∗∗∗ -0.002 0.006∗ 0.016∗∗∗ -0.002 0.006∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Objective 1×GBYS 0.002∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
GBYS -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
NUTS2 ﬁxed eﬀects no yes yes no yes yes
Observations 274 250 174 274 250 174
No. regions 149 149 149 149 149 149
AIC -1694.864 -2028.886 -1511.265 -1694.588 -2029.357 -1526.619
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. All estimates base on a two-stage
least square approach using eligibility as the instrument, controlling for the forcing variable and its interactions,
and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Speciﬁcations without NUTS2 ﬁxed eﬀects include country ﬁxed eﬀects. The exposure to the
Financial and Economic Crisis, is measured by government-bond-yields spreads (GBYS). Government-bond-yields
spreads are denoted in percent. We use data for 2005, 2006 in the ﬁrst period and 2009-2012 in the second period.
Lower AIC indicates better model-ﬁt. For details about the data sources see Table A1.
Table 4: NUTS2 Regions no longer in Objective 1 status
No longer Obj.1 in 2000-2006 No longer Obj.1 in 2007-2013
but in 1994-1999 but in 2000-2006
NUTS2 code Name NUTS2 code Name
BE32 Prov. Hainaut AT11 Burgenland (AT)
DE30 Berlin DE42 Brandenburg - Su¨dwest
ES13 Cantabria DED3 Leipzig
FR83 Corse ES12 Principado de Asturias
IE02 Southern and Eastern ES41 Castilla y Leo´n
ITF1 Abruzzo ES52 Comunidad Valenciana
ITF2 Molise ES62 Regio´n de Murcia
NL23 Flevoland ES63 Ciudad Auto´noma de Ceuta
PT17 Lisboa ES64 Ciudad Auto´noma de Melilla
UKM6 Highlands and Islands ES70 Canarias
UKN0 Northern Ireland FI13 Ita¨-Suomi
DEE2 Halle
FI19 La¨nsi-Suomi
FI1A Pohjois-Suomi
GR12 Kentriki Makedonia
GR13 Dytiki Makedonia
GR24 Sterea Ellada
GR30 Attiki
GR42 Notio Aigaio
HU10 Ko¨ze´p-Magyarorsza´g
IE01 Border, Midland and Western
ITF5 Basilicata
ITG2 Sardegna
PT15 Algarve
PT30 Regia˜o Auto´noma da Madeira
SE31 Norra Mellansverige
SE32 Mellersta Norrland
SE33 O¨vre Norrland
UKD5 Merseyside
UKE3 South Yorkshire
Notes: The majority of these regions received phasing-out support in the programming period after loosing Objec-
tive 1 support. All regions that received Objective 1 support in the period 1989-1993 received Objective 1 support
in the period 1994-1999, too.
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Table 5: Eﬀects of entering and loosing Objective 1 treatment – 1989-2013
Entering Objective 1 Losing Objective 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP per capita growth
Change status 0.026∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.017∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
Observations 515 515 167 167
No. regions 193 193 68 68
AIC -3038.959 -3168.091 -821.291 -824.415
Employment growth
Change status 0.007∗∗ 0.006∗ -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Observations 515 515 167 167
No. regions 193 193 68 68
AIC -3529.970 -3564.679 -1060.037 -1062.404
Investment per GDP
Change status -0.005 -0.000 0.033∗∗∗ 0.016
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013)
Observations 515 515 167 167
No. regions 193 193 68 68
AIC -2621.725 -2626.276 -695.260 -708.888
Public investment per GDP
Change status 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 412 412 118 118
No. regions 190 190 61 61
AIC -2533.090 -2597.189 -876.029 -876.170
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. All estimates base on a ﬁxed
eﬀect speciﬁcation controlling for the forcing variable and its interactions. We use only regions that comply with
the eligibility rule and accordingly estimate a sharp RDD. Growth rates refer to log diﬀerences divided by the
number of years. Change status is a dummy either indicating observations that received Objective 1 transfers for
the ﬁrst time (columns (1) and (2)) or observations that received Objective 1 transfers in the previous period and
lost this status (columns (3) and (4)). In total 95 observations switched Objective 1 status (55 gained and 40 lost
Objective status) in the programming periods considered. All Entering Objective 1 speciﬁcations are restricted to
observations that never received Objective 1 transfers or received them for the ﬁrst time. Speciﬁcations for Losing
Objective 1 are restricted to observations that always received Objective 1 transfers or lost them in the previous
period. Columns (1) and (3) include linear terms of the forcing variable; columns (2) and (3) include quadratic
terms of the forcing variable. Since we identify from changes in status, all speciﬁcations are restricted to three out
of four periods because we have no data prior to 1989-1993. Lower AIC indicates better model-ﬁt.
Table 6: Income inequality across EU15 NUTS2 regions: 1989-2013
1989 1994 2000 2007
Coeﬃcient of variation (CV) 2232.558 2724.720 3510.096 4682.964
Range/mean 5.277 5.270 4.930 5.471
Notes: We use per-capita GDP (PPP) in EU NUTS2 regions to compute the coeﬃcient of variation (CV) and the
ratio of the distribution’s range and mean. These measures are compared for the ﬁrst years of the four budgetary
periods under consideration.
18
Figure 1: Assignment of Objective 1 treatment
Notes: The graph corresponds to the pooled data for all four programming periods.
Figure 2: Density check to detect potential manipulation of GDP per capita
Notes: The graph shows a density plot of GDP per capita in the years determining eligibility for Objective 1 status.
Data are pooled over all four programming periods.
Appendix
NUTS regions
Eurostat, the statistical agency of the European Union, operates a regional classiﬁcation
scheme of ﬁve levels for all regional units within the EU, the Nomenclature des Unite´s
Territoriales Statistiques (NUTS). The highest level of regional aggregation (NUTS1) cor-
responds to Germany’s Bundesla¨nder, France’s Zones d’E´tudes et d’Ame´nagement du Ter-
ritoire, the United Kingdom’s Regions of England/Scotland/Wales, Spain’s Grupos de Co-
munidades Auto´nomas, Italy’s Gruppi di Regioni Nord-Est/Nord-Ovest/Centro/Sud/Isole,
or Austria’s clusters of Bundesla¨nder, namely, Westo¨sterreich/Su¨do¨sterreich/Osto¨sterreich.
At the other end of the NUTS classiﬁcation scheme, NUTS5 regions correspond to munic-
ipalities. From an institutional point of view, two subnational aggregates are particularly
important for EU Regional Policy, namely NUTS2 and NUTS3. The following types of
regions correspond to NUTS2: Regierungsbezirke (Germany), Re´gions (France), Groups
of Metropolitan Counties or Shire Counties (United Kingdom), Comunidades y Ciudades
Auto´nomas (Spain), Regioni (Italy), or Bundesla¨nder (Austria). The following types of
regions correspond to NUTS3: Landkreise (Germany), De´partements (France), Unitary
Authorities (United Kingdom), Provincias y Islas y Ceuta y Melilla (Spain), Provincie
(Italy), and Gruppen von Politischen Bezirken (Austria). The NUTS2 and NUTS3 ag-
gregates are important, since the allocation of funding is determined at those levels (e.g.,
eligibility under the Objective 1 line is determined at the NUTS2 level, and actual funding
at other levels and reporting thereof to the EU is determined at the NUTS3 level).
Note that the regional aggregation – NUTS – was adjusted on a regular basis (i.e. in
the years 1995, 1999, 2003, 2006, 2010, and 2013) and data is not available for all outcomes
and all years according to a homogeneous classiﬁcation. We use the 2003 classiﬁcation
for the ﬁrst two periods as many units cannot be uniquely assigned the classiﬁcation from
2006.
Table A1: Data sources
Variable Source
Objective 1 status Oﬃcial Journal of the European Communities
1989-93 Number L 374, Volume 31, 31.12.1988
1994-99 Number L 193, Volume 36, 31.7.1993
2000-06 Number L 194, Volume 53, 27.7.1999
2007-13 Number L 243, Volume 44, 6.9.2006
Expenditures European Commission: DG Regio
GDP per capita - NUTS2/3 Eurostat & Cambridge Econometrics 2015
Employment - NUTS2/3 (by sectors) Cambridge Econometrics 2015
Gross value added - NUTS2/3 (by sectors) Cambridge Econometrics 2015
Population - NUTS2/3 Eurostat
Active population - NUTS2/3 Cambridge Econometrics 2015
Total investment Eurostat
Public investment Eurostat
Participation rate in education & training Eurostat
Total hours worked of employees - NUTS2/3 Cambridge Econometrics 2015
Total compensation of employees - NUTS2/3 Cambridge Econometrics 2015
Government-bond-yield spreads (GBY S) European Central Bank & OECD
Table A2: Descriptive statistics NUTS2 – 1989-2013
Mean StdDev Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GDP per capita growth .03 .02 -.06 .13
Employment growth .006 .02 -.08 .07
Total investment per GDP .23 .06 .11 .62
Public investment per GDP .03 .04 1.63e-08 .27
Objective 1 .31 .46 .00 1.00
Eligible for Objective 1 .28 .45 .00 1.00
GDP per capita minus 75% of EU average 2790.60 5479.27 -8851.53 40895.61
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Table A3: EU15 regions eligible for Objective 1 under hypothetical EU15 threshold- 2007-
2013
NUTS2 code Name Phasing-out
BE32 Prov. Hainaut 1
BE34 Prov. Luxembourg (BE) 0
BE35 Prov. Namur 0
ES12 Principado de Asturias 1
ES62 Regio´n de Murcia 1
ES63 Ciudad Auto´noma de Ceuta 1
ES64 Ciudad Auto´noma de Melilla 1
GR12 Kentriki Makedonia 1
GR13 Dytiki Makedonia 1
GR30 Attiki 1
ITF5 Basilicata 1
UKD5 Merseyside 0
UKM6 Highlands and Islands 1
Notes: Note that for the programming period 2000-2006 the EU15 threshold was applied for EU15 regions.
Table A4: Eﬀects of Objective 1 treatment in EU15 regions during the Crisis – 2000-2013
Linear 2nd. order polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita growth
Objective 1 0.004 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.003 0.012∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Objective 1×GBYS -0.003∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
GBYS -0.004∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
NUTS2 ﬁxed eﬀects no yes yes no yes yes
Observations 422 422 348 422 422 348
No. regions 211 211 211 211 211 211
AIC -2604.847 -2809.102 -2563.986 -2607.398 -2867.684 -2576.552
Employment growth
Objective 1 0.002 0.020∗∗∗ 0.014∗ -0.000 0.016∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.002) (0.006) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
Objective 1×GBYS 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002)
GBYS -0.005∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
NUTS2 ﬁxed eﬀects no yes yes no yes yes
Observations 422 422 348 422 422 348
No. regions 211 211 211 211 211 211
AIC -2582.447 -2779.992 -2364.746 -2586.054 -2826.028 -2402.833
Investment per GDP
Objective 1 0.006 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.013)
Objective 1×GBYS -0.001 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003)
GBYS -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
NUTS2 ﬁxed eﬀects no yes yes no yes yes
Observations 422 422 348 422 422 348
No. regions 211 211 211 211 211 211
AIC -1467.031 -2470.157 -1985.164 -1464.496 -2470.182 -1985.679
Public investment per GDP
Objective 1 0.021∗∗∗ -0.009∗∗ 0.375 0.020∗∗∗ -0.013∗∗∗ 0.108
(0.004) (0.004) (1.034) (0.005) (0.004) (0.184)
Objective 1 Crisis 0.631 0.190
(1.748) (0.320)
GBYS 0.003 -0.000
(0.012) (0.003)
NUTS2 ﬁxed eﬀects no yes yes no yes yes
Observations 194 170 96 194 170 96
No. regions 109 109 109 109 109 109
AIC -1166.472 -1384.826 -759.391 -1171.652 -1389.450 -894.495
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively. All estimates base on a two-stage
least square approach using eligibility as the instrument, controlling for the forcing variable and its interactions,
and time ﬁxed eﬀects. Speciﬁcations without NUTS2 ﬁxed eﬀects include country ﬁxed eﬀects. The exposure to the
Financial and Economic Crisis, is measured by government-bond-yields spreads (GBYS). Government-bond-yields
spreads are denoted in percent. We use data for 2005, 2006 in the ﬁrst period and 2009-2012 in the second period.
Lower AIC indicates better model-ﬁt. For details about the data sources see Table A1.
Figure A1: Continuity of covariates
Notes: The graph shows depicts local averages as well as a local polynomial ﬁts for the covariates against the forcing
variable.
